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Abstract 
It is increasingly considered appropriate to deal with international energy issues, such as 
achieving energy market stability and energy supply security and countering climate change, on 
a regional or even global level. The large energy-importing countries in Northeast Asia – China, 
Japan and South Korea – have also begun discussing establishing cooperation on energy issues 
although some obstacles are in place. Based on the experiences of the European Union, strong 
top-down imposed cooperation helps creating a strong framework that ensures ongoing 
integration, but is less effective at achieving results for more specific issues. Therefore, 
establishing energy cooperation in the Northeast Asian countries should start bottom-up, 
although top-down cooperation should be aimed for at the same time. By focusing on some 
more concrete topics first, the cooperation that is established on the basis of these topics could 
then be used as a basis for further cooperation. Some topics that could have this function are 
technology transfer on energy efficiency, joint stockpiling, transportation safety, and external 
policy to enhance bargaining power towards supplier states. Looking at the experiences of the 
EU, it is more likely that cooperation will be established on other topics than security issues. 
Therefore, especially technology transfer could play a large role in establishing energy 
cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Northeast Asian countries have recently begun to feel the need to cooperate in the 
field of energy. As in all energy-importing countries in the world, fears have risen over 
security of energy supplies; and the issue of climate change that is strongly linked to 
energy consumption is an issue that cannot be dealt with by single countries alone. 
However, differences between the energy mix and energy strategy employed by China 
on the one hand and Japan and South Korea on the other hand, lack of trust between the 
countries for historical reasons, and the lack of a well-established framework that could 
facilitate cooperation, make that establishing cooperation on energy issues in the region 
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is far from straightforward. In order to make an assessment on what kind of energy 
cooperation could be achieved in the Northeast Asian region, this paper takes a look at 
European energy cooperation in order to assess what could be the implications from the 
case of the European Union (EU). 
 
2. Energy cooperation in Northeast Asia 
 
2.1 Energy supply and demand in Northeast Asia 
The Northeast Asian energy market accounts for about 20% of energy supply worldwide, 
making the region one of the three largest energy markets in the world, together with the 
United States and Europe. Narrowly defined, Northeast Asia comprises China, Japan, 
and Korea,
2 and together these three countries account for around 70% of Asian oil 
demand.
3  As the region is home to some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, 
energy demand in Asia is forecasted to increase faster than in the rest of the world, 
accounting for around half of the world’s increase in energy demand by 2020, with 
China alone accounting for as much as 25% of the additional energy demand.
4  
  Figure 1: Projection of the world’s primary energy consumption
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2  When this paper refers to Korea, the Republic of Korea or South Korea is meant; the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea or North Korea is not addressed in this paper. 
3  APEC energy database, http://www.ieej.or.jp/egeda/database/database-top.html. 
4 Masahisa  Naitoh,  Long-term Energy Perspective and Challenges for Japan and Asia, WEC Asia 
Pacific Regional Forum, June 27 2005, http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/. 














Figure 2: Increase world’s primary energy consumption per country or region
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Therefore, the relative importance of the Northeast Asian market is likely to increase 
further, even though Japan and Korea are expected to show only very little growth in 
energy demand. This means that the dynamics of the energy market will not only be 
very important for Northeast Asia but that developments in the region will also have 
great influence on the world energy market.
7 
 
2.2 Measures taken to address energy challenges in Northeast Asia 
Like other major energy importing countries in the world, the countries in the Northeast 
Asian region have recently started to worry about securing enough energy to fuel their 
economies. These worries are the result of a combination of the recent oil price spikes, 
increasing energy nationalism in the supplier states and under-investment in the 
upstream energy sector, and expected strong worldwide growth of energy demand, 
which is likely to have a tight energy market as a result. Therefore, the Northeast Asian 
countries have started to adapt their national energy strategies to the changing 
environment and are paying more attention to achieving energy supply security.
8 
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Additionally, the national energy strategies are increasingly concerned with 
environmental issues,
9   since the emission of greenhouse gasses during energy 
consumption is responsible for climate change and environmental pollution.
10  
But not only on the national level in Northeast Asia attention is given to 
increasing the security of energy supplies and countering climate change and pollution. 
Also the formation of some sort of energy partnership is considered to be useful to 
achieve these objectives by both policy-makers and researchers.
11 The main argument 
for dealing with these issues within a cooperation framework is that the main threats to 
energy supply security originate outside the energy-importing countries and it could 
therefore be more effective to deal with these threats multilaterally and coordinately. 
Such a partnership would have to enhance energy supply security for all countries in the 
region and ensure at the same time that the growing energy demand of the developing 
economies in the region does not result in fierce competition for energy resources, 
which might lead to a diminishing security situation. Furthermore, coordinated action to 
fight climate change is considered more useful than countries addressing this issue on 
their own, as it is a global problem. This partnership would thus function as an addition 
to the countries’ national energy strategies.   
A number of specific topics are specifically mentioned to be useful to be 
addressed coordinately. As all Northeast Asian countries are strongly import-dependent 
for oil, it is argued that cooperation could enhance the joint bargaining position of the 
countries in the region
12 to enhance security of supplies to the whole region: 
“Cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries will provide us with bargaining 
power, leading to advantages for all Northeast Asian countries.”
13 Furthermore, the 
energy supply security situation of all Northeast countries can also be increased by 
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creating a joint stockpile mechanism,
14  and by enhancing the safety of transportation of 
energy to and in Asia.
15  In the area of dealing with climate change, an issue often 
mentioned as being a suitable topic for cooperation is technology transfer from the more 
developed countries to the lesser developed countries, in order to help them increase 
energy efficiency and conservation, and use energy in a cleaner fashion.
16 
 
2.3 Constraints to energy cooperation in Northeast Asia 
Cooperation, however, is not a straightforward strategy in a region with much distrust 
based on historical experiences, and when a huge variety among the countries is in place 
in income level, energy mix employed and technological advancement. Therefore, there 
are great challenges to be overcome before such cooperation is established in Northeast 
Asia. Firstly, energy security is generally considered to be of such importance that it 
touches upon the sovereignty of countries and giving up some of this sovereignty can 
prove to be something that countries are not willing to do, or otherwise only on a very 
limited scale. Therefore, taking action on this on a multilateral basis would require 
strong trust between the members of the cooperation framework. It might take years of 
intensive diplomacy and trust building before even the slightest bit of such cooperation 
is in place. The greatest challenge for establishing cooperation in the region, according 
to some, is to ensure stable relations between Japan and China.
17  
A second reason for cooperation being difficult is that the relations between the 
countries in Northeast Asia are not without obstacles. Relations can first of all be quite 
problematic for historical reasons and their present-day follow-up. An often-mentioned 
example in this respect is the issue of the Japanese prime-ministerial visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine, where, much to the anger of China and Korea Japanese war criminals 
are enshrined. The choice to visit the shrine is therefore always a delicate one. Secondly, 
disputes over land and over energy resources between the different countries in the 
region exist. Japan and South Korea both claim the Dokdo or Takeshima Islands in the 
Sea of Japan, and China and Japan both claim the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the 
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South China See. Also a number of gas fields in the East China Sea are disputed by 
China and Japan. These are the Chunxiao or Shirakaba and Tianwaitian or Kashi gas 
fields, where China has recently begun exploration, to the distress of Japan that is afraid 
that China is drilling for gas that is legally Japan’s. A third issue is China’s strong 
economic development which has lead to an equally impressive increase of energy 
demand, as shown in figures 1 and 2. This growth in demand leads to fears in Japan that 
their energy market with a growth of demand of around zero will become less and less 
attractive for suppliers.
18 And finally, China is often accused of having an ‘aggressive’ 
importing strategy,
19 for example because of its dealings with the Sudan, where China 
blocked UN military actions in the country that would be sent to create a solution for 
the violence in the Darfur area. All of these reasons contribute to distrust in the 
relationships over energy issues in the region.   
A third reason why energy cooperation can be difficult to establish is where 
Japan and Korea share many characteristics of their energy mix and energy strategies, 
China has a very different energy mix and energy security strategy in place. When 
countries’ energy mix deployed differ largely, it can be difficult to discover an area in 
which all countries share the same objectives and could leverage bargaining power.   
 
 
  Figure 3: Primary energy supply of Japan, South Korea, and China
20 
 
As seen in figure 3, Japan’s and Korea’s energy supplies are dominated by oil that 
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accounts for a little under half of their primary supplies. Also the share of coal, gas, and 
nuclear energy as a part of total energy supplies are comparable in size. And almost all 
of the gas supplied to both countries is in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
China’s energy mix, however, is dominated by coal, which makes up 71% of the 
primary energy supply, and the country has only a small share of gas: around 3%. The 
differences in energy mix deployed have as an implication that there is another major 
difference between the energy supply security situations of Japan and Korea on the one 
hand and China on the other hand: the rate of self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency is around 
18% for Japan
21  and Korea and around 90% for China, if nuclear energy is included in 
the self-sufficiency rate. The main reason for this is that China possesses a large amount 
of natural resources, especially coal, while Japan and Korea are very resource poor. 
Although there are also some similarities between primary energy supplies of the 
Northeast Asian countries, such as a high import-dependency for oil, these differences 
are likely to make cooperation more difficult. 
A final reason why energy cooperation could be very hard to establish is 
because there is no strongly developed framework for establishing cooperation. Some 
regional partnerships, such as ASEAN+3, EAS and APEC, have been created in East 
Asia, all of which consider energy to be part of their objectives for cooperation, but 
there is no clear framework between the Northeast Asian countries only, although there 
are ties between China and Japan and Japan and Korea in the form of bilateral energy 
dialogues. Furthermore, Japan and Korea are IEA-members, while China is not. This 
situation makes it difficult to find the right framework for cooperation on energy issues 
in the region. 
Thus, establishing energy cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries is 
considered to be useful in order to increase the security of energy supplies and to more 
effectively counter climate change. But, because of the differences in energy mix and 
energy strategy between the countries, the historical problems in the region and the lack 
of a strong cooperation framework, this is unlikely to be a straightforward process. Still, 
even though many difficulties have to be overcome, from another region in the world – 
the European Union – that already has overcome some of these difficulties, lessons 
might be learned in order to see what could be the way forward for cooperation among 
the Northeast Asian countries. 
 
 
3. Energy policy of the European Union 
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3.1 History of European cooperation 
European energy cooperation has taken place for more than fifty years; the European 
Union has its roots in cooperation over energy resources, namely in the European Coal 
and Steel Community. After the devastations of the Second World War, six European 
countries – France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg – 
decided in 1951 that in order to make sure the continent would not see another war, they 
should cooperate on these vital resources. In 1957, this union was consolidated though 
the establishment of the Treaty of Rome that marked the official birth of the European 
Economic Community. Since then, the EU has known tremendous success as it has been 
able to achieve a unique degree of cooperation on a wide number of issues. Also the 
number of members has increased enormously: the Union now has 27 member states 
















Figure 4: The process of enlarging the European Union 
 
The European Union is first and foremost an economic community. This has been the 
case since the Treaty of Rome, which aimed at economic integration of the European 
countries though ensuring the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital. 
Economic policies, which aim at the creation of this single market, thus form the main 
body of EU policies: the European Community. In addition to this first pillar of EU 
policy, two other pillars have been added over the years: Common Foreign and Security IEEJ: April 2008 
Policy, and police and judicial cooperation. Where the European countries can see the 
advantage of economic integration, it is considered rather undesirable to give up 
sovereignty in the fields of politics and law, thus resulting in an EU that is far more 
developed economically than politically. Next to promoting economic development on 
the continent, other factors have contributed to the process of European integration. It is 
often argued that the peoples of Europe share similar cultures and a similar history, 
which facilitated trust building and the forming of the Union. And at the beginning of 
European integration, an important aim was to prevent another war on a continent from 
happening. This spirit made sure there was great momentum for integration, which was 
further spurred by the rise of Russia as a common enemy and the forming of NATO as a 
security community under leadership of the United States, which made it easier for the 
European countries to focus on economic cooperation.   
The uneven development of the three pillars is reflected in the difference 
between the decision making processes within the pillars. Within the Community, most 
policies are decided on by a qualified majority voting system that gives countries a 
voting weight that is relative to the number of inhabitants and to their importance within 
the EU. Furthermore, the European Commission, which represents the main executive 
body of the EU, has a clear mandate to enforce the decisions that have been made 
within the Community. Within the other two pillars, however, policies must be agreed 
on by unanimity to become effective. This means that all countries have to agree on a 
certain decision in the European Council, the main decision-making body of the EU, 
where every member state has only one vote. Making economic EU policies thus 
usually involves a less complicated decision making process than deciding on political 
or judicial issues, that often involve tough negotiations between the member states. This 
is especially the case in areas that member states consider to be crucial to their national 
interests. Although the degree of development of the policy areas thus varies widely, 
general trends over the past fifty years show that the more the EU member states 
integrate, the more difficult it becomes for the member states to make their own policies. 
And, the more pervasive EU policies become, the more necessity there is for further 





3.2 The development of a common energy policy for Europe 
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Within this complex entity of European cooperation, a common energy policy for 
Europe has been developed, although a coherent energy policy framework has not been 
established until recently. In March 2006 the European Commission published a Green 
Paper on energy which called for the development of an ‘Energy Policy for Europe’. 
During the 50 years of European integration, a wide variety of energy-related policies 
had been added to the European Community and attention shifted according to the 
urgency that was felt to achieve certain goals at certain times. An important factor that 
influenced the attention that is given to energy is the situation on the world energy 
market. At times when the energy market was tight, attention to energy security 
increased. Although the EU has some energy reserves, the area as a whole is heavily 
import dependent. Currently, import dependence is around 50%, but it is expected that 
as European energy sources will reach their peak soon and demand will continue to rise 
steadily with around 1% or 2% per year, the EU’s import dependence will rise to around 
70% for gas and around 90% for oil.
23 This means that with the current tight situation 
on the energy market, energy has captured attention of policy makers and it is likely to 
remain a topic often discussed in European Council meetings. 
At other times, however, energy issues, although never completely out of sight, 
were given far less attention on the European level. While the origins of the EU are in 
the European Coal and Steel Community, in the years following the Treaty of Rome, 
energy was barely mentioned within the EU framework. Following the oil shocks of the 
1970s, attention was renewed and all over the world measures were taken for enhancing 
energy security, such as the establishment of the International Energy Agency. Some 
policies were also put into place on the EU level, but most security enhancing measures 
were taken by the member states on the national level. These measures proved quite 
successful and attention of the EU countries shifted to other aspects of energy policy: to 
energy market liberalization and to diminishing pollution as a result of energy 
consumption. Against the background of the liberalization of a number of national 
energy markets, and the wider economic integration of the EU member states, the 
energy market was rediscovered as an area where further integration of the member 
states’ economies could take place and in 1988 the European Commission proposed the 
establishment of the Single Energy Market. Recently, attention to energy on the EU 
level shifted back to security of the energy supplies, as a result of the recent oil price 
spikes and increased resource nationalism. Especially the Russian gas cut-off to the 
Ukraine, which is the major transit country to Western Europe, on January 1st 2006, had 
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a large effect on the spirit within the EU. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the 
European Commission issued the Green Paper on energy in March 2006, in which is 
called for the development of a coherent EU level energy policy framework. 
 
3.3 Policy for the single European energy market 
The current EU energy policy embodied by the March 2006 Green Paper addresses 
three objectives: competitiveness, security and sustainability.
24 It gathers previously 
installed EU energy policies and identifies the areas that are should be developed further. 
The first objective, competitiveness, aims at further integration of the national energy 
markets to allow for more competition within the EU.   
 
Table 1: The competitiveness component of EU energy policy 
Achievements Problems 
-  Single European energy market for 
electricity and gas (July 1 2007) 
-  Convergence of taxing and pricing 
policies 
- Environmental  standards 
- Price  transparency 
-  Guidelines for state aid 
-  Commission functions as ‘watchdog’, 
with authority to punish countries 
-  Many bottlenecks in interconnections 
national energy grids 
-  Many large national energy companies 
have often not yet ‘unbundled’   
-  Member states still promote their 
national energy companies 
 
On July 1
st 2007, the single European energy market for electricity and gas was 
formally realized. From that date on, all European consumers have the legal right to 
choose their electricity and gas producer from anywhere within the EU.
25 In order to 
realize this internal market, measures have been taken to remove trade barriers, such as 
converging taxing and pricing policies, setting environmental standards, ensuring price 
transparency, and issuing guidelines for state aid.
26 Furthermore, the European 
Commission was appointed as ‘watchdog’ to guard the functioning of the internal 
market and was given the authority to punish countries that do not comply with the 
liberalization measures. Thus, countries saw some of their power over their energy 
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markets diminish and their policies converge to guidelines issued on the EU level.   
However, in practice the internal market still has many imperfections. The 
member states’ energy markets are still primarily nationally oriented, and there are 
many bottlenecks in the interconnections between the member states’ grids.
27 In order 
to solve these problems, the Commission has identified two areas where improvements 
are especially necessary for further development of the internal market. The first is that 
extra investments are necessary for maintaining the national grids and for creating better 
interconnectivity; the Commission stimulates the member states to make these 
investments.
28  The second area identified for improving competitiveness is that in some 
member states large national energy utilities have not yet unbundled their control of the 
infrastructure from their business of selling electricity and gas as was stated in European 
regulations.
29 However, ownership unbundling is opposed by most member states, led 
by France and Germany. Therefore, the Commission has issued a number of warnings to 
the member states that have not yet complied with the regulations, but it is unlikely that 
all EU member states will see full unbundling within their energy sectors.
30 Also  more 
generally, many member states continue to promote their national energy companies, 
instead of stimulating more competition. A notorious example of this was the 
intervention of the French government by promoting a merger of state-owned Gaz de 
France, with the French company, Suez, after Suez faced foreign take-over, to create the 
fourth largest energy company in Europe. Achievements in the area of creating an 
internal market for electricity and gas are thus quite extensive, but some problems 
persist; most notably in the areas of interconnection and ownership unbundling. 
 
3.4 EU energy policy for sustainability 
The second element of EU energy policy is sustainability. Among the sustainable 
elements of the European energy policy framework are targets for energy conservation 
(20% by 2020) and the amount of green energy as part of the energy mix (20% of the 
energy mix by 2020, with a minimum of 10% for biofuels).
31  Furthermore, 
technological innovation in the areas of energy conservation and renewable energy 
sources is stimulated through subsidizing research. Also, the greenhouse gas emissions 
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allowance trading scheme has been established, which is a trading scheme for 
allowances to emit a tonne of carbon dioxide during a specific period. If only because of 
its scale – the EU accounts for about 20% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions – the 
scheme is valued very positively by experts.
32 A recent achievement in the field of 
sustainable energy policy is that a target for total EU CO2-emission reduction has been 
set. Emissions will be cut by 20% from 1990 levels by 2020, or even by 30% if other 
developed countries commit to the same goal.
33 All these measures are aimed at 
making the European Union the leading energy market in the field of CO2-emission 
cuts and renewable energy. 
 
Table 2: The sustainability component of EU energy policy 
Achievements Problems 
-  Targets for energy conservation (20% 
by 2020) 
-  Targets for green energy (20% of 
energy mix by 2020) 
-  Subsidies for research on energy 
efficiency and renewables 
-  Greenhouse gas emissions allowance 
trading scheme 
-  Target for CO2-emission reduction 
(20% or 30% by 2020) 
-  Failure to reconfirm the target for 
green energy as part of energy mix 
-  Member states issued too many 
emissions allowances 
-  Division of member states’ 
contributions to CO2-emission cuts 
has not been agreed on yet 
 
Despite the positive reactions to the emissions trading scheme and the optimism of the 
European Commission that the EU will become the most environmentally-friendly 
energy consuming region in the world, the reality is still far from this ideal picture. 
Recently, the European Commission failed to reconfirm the targets for renewable 
energy to meet 20% of demand by 2020.
34 And even though the trading scheme is 
considered to be a success just because it is in place, in practice it does not work as well 
as it could; it suffered hugely from member states that issued more emissions 
allowances than were required, which resulted in a fall in the price of the allowances.
35 
And with respect to the much-celebrated agreement on the carbon cuts, a general target 
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has been set, but the division of the contribution of the individual member states has not 
been agreed on yet. The new EU member states that are relatively less developed do not 
have to contribute as much as the overall target, but it is unlikely that the rest of the 
member states will voluntarily contribute more than the agreed target to make up for 
this. The overall problem with many of these environmental policies is that the EU can 
only function as guideline provider without much authority to punish member states that 
do not comply, as the real executive power is in many of these cases in the hands of the 
member states.   
 
3.5 EU energy security policy 
The objective of security refers to securing the necessary amount of energy supplies for 
the European market.   
 
Table 3: The security component of EU energy policy 
Achievements Problems 
-  Directives for petroleum stockpiles 
-  Transport safety regulations 
-  Directives for a diversified energy mix
-  External energy policy component:   
o  Energy dialogues with suppliers 
are in place 
o  Integration of neighbor countries 
and candidate member states into 
the EU energy market 
-  Statement of solidarity in case of 
emergency is in place 
-  Stockpile sharing mechanism in case 
of emergency is not in place 
-  Few political achievements from 
energy dialogues with suppliers 
-  Neighbor countries and candidate 
member states are not yet fully 
integrated into the EU energy market 
-  Member states promote bilateral 
relations with suppliers 
 
This aspect of EU energy policy comprises both strategies for emergencies and 
strategies that aim at increasing the security of energy supply on a longer term. 
Short-term security strategies include directives for petroleum stockpiles, and transport 
safety regulations. Strategies that aim at securing energy supplies on the longer term 
include guidelines for putting a diversified energy mix in place, and the development of 
an external energy policy that aims at improving relations with the supplier states and 
transit countries. After the development of a single energy market within the European 
Union, a common external policy is considered to have become useful for increasing IEEJ: April 2008 
security of supply to the European market.
36 This external energy strategy consists of 
initiatives towards the energy supplier states and for cooperation with developing 
countries, and a number of initiatives for the neighboring countries and aspiring 
member states.
37 This latter group is more developed and focuses foremost on the 
integration of neighboring countries and candidate member states into the European 
energy market.   
The security component is, however, the least developed element of EU energy 
policy and many problems exist. Although energy security is a topic that is of great 
concern to all member states, it is also the most difficult topic for establishing 
cooperation. On the EU level, an energy stockpiling system is in place, but an actual 
emergency system that defines the working of solidarity has not been developed. 
Furthermore, the external dimension of EU energy policy knows many problems. 
Within the energy dialogues with supplier states very few real successes are booked, 
most agreements do not include clear deals on supply for instance, and the 
neighborhood countries’ energy markets are far from integrated into the EU yet; the EU 
has even been accused of not taking the neighbor’s interests seriously.
38 And further 
development of the EU external energy policy is being undermined by some member 
states that rather develop their own, bilateral, relations with supplier states. Therefore, 
also in this area, more solidarity between the member states is called for.
39 Despite  that 
some security measures are in place, the EU does not yet have a coherent energy 
security policy. 
 
3.6 Mixed results of EU energy cooperation 
European energy policy, thus, covers almost all aspects of energy policy. In this sense, 
the achievements of EU energy policy are great, even though many aspects are only 
covered in the form of guidelines for the member states. However, the development of 
the different components varies greatly: the objective of competitiveness in the form of 
creating the internal market is much more developed than the other two objectives. It is 
argued that this uneven development does not do justice to the current situation for the 
European energy market, as security concerns cannot be solved by completing the 
single market alone.
40  And, as described, the actual achievements in the area of security 
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are quite limited, leaving much room for improvement. 
Two main reasons can be identified for the mixed results of EU energy policy. 
The first is that the policy framework aims at addressing many aspects of energy policy, 
which means that the framework is very comprehensive, but, therefore, also somewhat 
unfocused. And sometimes the different objectives are even conflicting. An example is 
that while in the short term a reasonable price for electricity and gas is desirable for the 
European consumers, a higher energy price might be an important contributive element 
for ensuring a more sustainable energy mix in the long term.
41  The Green Paper is thus 
a first attempt at a coherent energy policy framework, but as over time, according to the 
urgency that is felt to achieve different objectives, elements were added to the 
framework, it has become too complex to get focused results.   
The second, and perhaps more important, reason is the friction between the EU 
level policies and the member states’ actions. One of the main causes of this friction is 
that the choice for the energy mix deployed remains a sovereign choice for the member 
states and will not be interfered with by the EU level. But as the member states have a 
very different energy mix in place, this makes it more difficult to design a common EU 
level energy strategy. Furthermore, the EU level framework largely consists of 
directories for the member states to be carried out, which means that, in practice, the 
member states still have the executive power. Where EU level policies could have 
negative consequences for the member states, they will thus try to obstruct the 
implementation of the EU level regulations or at least try to implement them in a way 
that is as advantageous as possible. This is for instance the case for the emissions 
trading scheme, as some member states handed out too many allowances to their 
companies, thereby undermining the scheme. Moreover, sometimes general objectives 
are agreed on, but the division between the different member states remains problematic, 
as is the case with the division of the CO2-emission cuts target. And also, as EU energy 
security policy is still far from providing a secure energy supply situation for the 
member states, many of them rather keep things under their own control by promoting 
their national champions and fostering bilateral ties with supplier countries.
42  
Thus, the reality is although some great achievements have been made, 
especially in the field of establishing the single energy market, the European Union is 
still far from achieving a coherent energy policy that is implemented by all member 
states. Therefore, it has been decided that in order to harmonize the member states’ 
energy policies somewhat, an Annual Review of the national energy strategies will take 
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place on the European level, which should make further development of EU energy 
policy more smoothly. Although it might still take much time and many tough 
negotiations, according to functionalist theorists it is likely that more integration will 
take place between the member states in the field of energy eventually.   
 
4. Implications from the EU for Northeast Asia 
 
4.1 Lessons from EU energy cooperation 
The European Union has a lot of experience with cooperation on energy issues. From 
this integration process some implications can be made for other communities that try to 
achieve energy cooperation. As heavily import dependent regions that aim for achieving 
a more sustainable energy mix and cutting CO2-emissions, the EU and Northeast Asia 
share important policy aims, but the differences between the two regions are more 
striking. Within Northeast Asia, the differences between the GDP per capita of the 
countries are much larger. And in Europe, unlike in Northeast Asia, a strongly 
developed cooperation framework is present. However, besides the characteristics of the 
community, another factor can also be decisive for establishing energy cooperation: the 
external pressure of a tight energy market. This factor was a driving force for policy 
development on the EU level, and, as it is expected that the energy market will remain 
tight in the near future, this will likely be a strong driver for the Northeast Asian 
countries to cooperate. Some general implications from the EU for cooperation on 
energy issues will be made for establishing energy cooperation in the Northeast Asian 
region. 
The main implication from the European case is that in order to establish 
cooperation, installing a top-down framework can be useful for creating common 
ground and for building trust between the different countries, but it can also prove to be 
an obstacle for achieving more specific goals on the short time, as it takes time to install 
such a framework. Therefore, the Northeast Asian countries could better find specific 
topics for energy cooperation first. If cooperation on these topics works, in a (neo) 
functionalist way further integration and trust-building is likely to follow, and it may 
lead to a continuing cooperation process. However, it should also be noted that this 
implication mainly follows from a region where a cooperation framework was already 
present, which is not the case for Northeast Asia. There, still many obstacles for 
cooperation are present and lack of trust between the countries can be observed. 
Therefore, while topic-wise bottom-up cooperation can provide a starting point, 
top-down cooperation should be attempted at the same time, to create a framework and IEEJ: April 2008 
ensuring trust-building. 
  A second implication is that cooperation on energy issues should not focus on 
too many issues at the same time. EU energy policy comprises three large elements that 
are considered equally important, although over time attention shifts between the three 
elements. As shown from the case of the EU, this could mean that not all results aimed 
for are achieved and that sometimes even conflicting policies are adopted. In order to 
make sure that energy cooperation in Northeast Asian does not suffer from trying to 
achieve too many goals at the same time, the countries should focus only on some 
issues that are considered most important to get results for.   
The third implication is that for topics where national interests are felt to be 
strongest, such as security issues, cooperation agreements are less likely to be achieved 
than for topics that aim at achieving common economic gains and increasing 
sustainability. Between the national level and the European level often friction was 
shown; the member states are reluctant to give up their power to the EU level, especially 
in the area of national security. Within the EU, besides the presence of external pressure 
of tight energy markets, the creation of the single market was central to overcoming 
some of this power struggle between the two policy making levels. This proved crucial 
for the development of energy policy and it continues to be crucial to for integrating the 
neighbor countries’ energy markets. In Northeast Asia, however, there is no aim of 
economic integration and for geological reasons no interconnecting grid or pipeline is 
present. Thus, sustainability-related topics are more likely to perform this function for 
integration. Later on, issues aiming at increasing security can be added. 
 
4.2 A starting point for energy cooperation in Northeast Asia 
From the experiences of the European Union, it can thus be concluded that in order to 
effectively increase energy supply security of the Northeast Asian region and diminish 
climate change at the same time, topical cooperation could provide the Northeast Asian 
countries with a starting-point for cooperation on energy issues. At the same time, 
top-down cooperation should be stimulated to remove some of the political barriers for 
cooperation. But in order to achieve some specific goals, bottom-up cooperation should 
not wait for these political processes to create a strong cooperation framework first. As 
described before, a number of issues is often mentioned as providing the Northeast 
Asian countries with a starting point for cooperation: technology transfer, joint 
stockpiling, transport safety, and a common bargaining position towards the energy 
supplying countries. These four topics are explored in order to assess their potential for 
establishing bottom-up cooperation in Northeast Asia. IEEJ: April 2008 
 
4.2.1 Technology transfer 
The first issue that was identified as a potential starting point for cooperation is 
technology transfer. The aim of this transfer of technology is to get a more sustainable 
energy mix and decrease the level of CO2-emissions in the Northeast Asian region. This 
technology transfer would take place mainly from Japan to the other Northeast Asian 
countries, as Japan is the more advanced country in this area. Since the 1970s, Japan has 
focused on energy efficiency and its energy intensity has been improved by more than 
30% over the past thirty years, making Japan probably the most energy efficient country 
in the world.
43 The countries in the region could profit from Japan’s expertise; the 
country is around nine times more energy efficient than China,
44  and around four times 
more efficient than Korea.   
Especially China, which is a large and inefficient energy consumer, is very 
interested in learning from Japan’s expertise.
45 Recently, therefore, during a visit of 
China’s premier to Japan, an agreement was reached to strengthen cooperation on 
energy issues that largely dealt with increasing energy conservation through technology 
transfer from Japan to China.
46 Some of the most promising technologies for 
cooperation are recycling, clean-coal technology, gas co-generation, operation of 
nuclear energy plants, and high-voltage transmission technology; a number of pilot 
projects are already in place in these areas. Furthermore, the two countries agreed that 
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry will train 300 Chinese government 
employees over the next three years in order to develop a Chinese conservation 
program.
47 It is considered unlikely however, that something like a free transfer of 
technology will take place. It is more likely, that a package deal will be made where 
Japanese companies get a share of China’s market, for selling turbines for instance. And, 
even though this area seems a very promising one for establishing cooperation on 
energy issues, there are in practice some problems associated with technology transfer. 
Of the pilot projects that have been realized, not many have been commercialized yet. 
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And, most of the technology is in the hands of the private sector, and as long as the 
patents and intellectual property rights are not secured, actual technology transfer 
becomes unlikely.
48  
  The EU does not have much experience in the area of technology transfer. For 
instance, when in May 2004 the EU grew with ten new member states that were much 
less developed technologically no such projects were undertaken on the EU level. 
Although candidate countries have to comply with EU guidelines on energy efficiency 
within the framework of the Community Acquis, the EU does not actively support these 
countries in their efforts to achieve this. Only within the joint implementation 
framework of the Kyoto protocol that aims at reducing the amount of CO2-emissions, 
some European countries helped some of the less developed countries to diminish their 
emissions, also outside the EU. Thus, it is difficult to derive any specific implications 
for technology transfer from the European case. The EU does, however, have some 
experience with cooperation on sustainable issues in general. One of the main problems 
in the area of sustainability is that although countries do see the importance and are 
willing to commit to it, they do not want to carry the burden economically. Within the 
EU, this was the case for the division of CO2-emission cut targets and with the carbon 
emission trading scheme. Also in Northeast Asia this problem is present. China recently 
also stated that it will keep on promoting economic growth over sustainable 
development.
49  This is likely to make cooperation on sustainable issues more difficult.   
Thus, it can be concluded that technology transfer is a very promising area for 
energy cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries, especially since a number of 
initiatives is already in place. But the general problem of investing in more sustainable 
energy consumption presents a trade-off over economic development is an obstacle for 
dividing the costs of cooperation on sustainability-enhancing topics, especially when the 
difference in income is large. Poorer, less economically developed countries with a low 
level of CO2-emissions per capita expect the richer, more polluting countries to 
contribute more to diminishing emissions. This is the case within the EU, as well as in 
the Northeast Asian region. But, if this issue can be resolved, as well as the issue of 
securing intellectual property rights, this area should be a very fruitful topic for energy 
cooperation in Northeast Asia.   
 
4.2.2 Joint Stockpiling 
Secondly, it was argued that joint stockpiling could increase the energy security 
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situation of the region and provide the Northeast Asian countries with a topic for 
establishing energy cooperation. The attitude to stockpiling Japan and Korea is, 
however, quite different from the situation in China. Japan and South Korea are both 
IEA members and thus have an emergency stockpiling system that stores at least an 
amount of petroleum that is the equivalent of ninety days of the total net oil imports.
50 
In Japan this stockpiling is done by both the public and the private sector, that together 
hold petroleum stocks that are the equivalent of around 170 days of consumption.
51 
Furthermore, the Japanese government recently proposed an idea to Saudi Arabia to 
consider to keep part of their petroleum inventories on Japanese territory, in exchange 
for priority access to these reserves in case of an emergency. This strategy has been in 
place in South-Korea already, where next to the national petroleum stockpiling facilities, 
also petroleum stocks of Norway, Algeria and Kuwait are stored. China on the other 
hand is not an IEA member and has only recently started with building up petroleum 
stockpiles. The country aims to have 30 days of imports worth of stockpiling facilities 
in 2010.
52  
Within the EU, a framework for petroleum stockpiling is already in place. 
According to European legislation, member states must hold stocks of petroleum 
products that are at least as large as 90 days’ average daily internal consumption.
53 
However, in order to truly boost security, these guidelines need to be complemented not 
only by statements of solidarity but also by defining the actual working of solidarity. 
Thus, even though creating a joint stockpiling system sounds like a very straightforward 
idea for cooperation that can easily create greater energy security, in reality it appears to 
be very difficult to establish such a system. Even within the EU countries, where much 
trust is present, no such system is in place, as only a guideline for the amount of 
petroleum stockpiling has been established, without defining further how this stockpile 
can be accessed or shared in times of emergency. Thus, it is expected that also in 
Northeast Asia it will be difficult to establish a joint system. It seems, however, likely 
that Japan in particular will continue to be interested in cooperation with China in this 
area to promote technical assistance, as they already have an agreement in place for 
access to each others stockpiles. Therefore, this could prove to be a topic to establish 
further cooperation from. But seen that this issue is security related, a clear joint 
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framework is unlikely to be established soon. 
 
4.2.3 Safe Transportation 
The third issue identified for cooperation is safe transportation. As all the Northeast 
Asian countries are heavily import-dependent, the safe arrival of their energy supplies is 
of crucial importance. Also, polluting the environment can occur during transport as a 
result of leaks or accidents, and also therefore, making sure that transportation of energy 
resources takes place safely is of great interest to the region. One of the most pressing 
problems for transport safety for the Northeast Asian region is the bottleneck of the 
Malacca Strait. In this bottleneck, where almost all of the oil to the region passes 
through, there is a threat of piracy.
54 Furthermore, if Russia becomes a larger energy 
supplier to the region, also the supply from that country could be a topic over which the 
countries in the region could establish cooperation. However, as the countries do no 
share a grid or pipelines, the issue of safe transportation is not limited to energy only. 
Within the EU, a number of guidelines for safe transportation is in place. The 
goal of these guidelines is, besides aiming at safety of transport as such, also to improve 
the interconnection of the national grids in order to ensure proper functioning of the 
internal market, including making sure enough competition is in place.
55 Safe 
transportation regulations within in the EU are thus mainly aimed at maintaining the 
grids that make up the internal market for electricity and gas. But, even though 
countries share concerns over safety, as executive power is in the hands of the member 
states and private companies, some weak spots still exist, especially concerning 
interconnections between the national energy grids. Also, some countries do not strive 
for further integration into the single market. As there is no aim for integration of the 
national energy markets in the Northeast Asian region, this tension between achieving 
greater transportation safety and promoting national interests is not present. Therefore, 
especially the issue of the danger in the Malacca Straight can be used for establishing 
cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries. But, this is not an issue that is 
important for energy security only and it is, thus, not likely to be at the center of 
attention for cooperation on energy issues. 
 
4.2.4 Common bargaining position towards suppliers 
The final issue identified was the common bargaining position towards the energy 
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supplying countries.  It is often argued that the heavily import-dependent Northeast 
Asian countries should cooperate to create a bargaining position towards their energy 
suppliers. This could be especially effective towards the Middle East, where most of the 
oil for the region is imported from (see figure 5). 
 
 




A more specific issue where a common bargaining position could be useful, is for is the 
issue of the Asian Premium. This is the issue where the price of a barrel of oil exported 
from the Middle East to Asia is around 1 to 2 dollars higher than the price for Europe 
and the US. It is considered useful to cooperate on these issues simply because the three 
countries would be stronger dealing with these issues together than dealing with them 
on their own. 
 A problem with creating a common bargaining position, however, is that not 
only the Northeast Asian countries employ a different energy mix; their energy 
supplying states differ too. Although all three countries depend largely on the Middle 
East for oil, Japan’s and Korea’s dependencies on Middle Eastern supplies are around 
90% and 80% respectively,
57 but China has achieved a more diversified oil supply, 
importing large amounts of oil from Russia, Venezuela and from a number of African 
countries, such as Angola and the Sudan.
58 This makes it difficult to find a common 
ground for cooperation. 
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In addition to having difficulties with finding a common position towards 
supplier states, the Northeast Asian countries also have their own energy strategies in 
place and often pursue bilateral ties with their energy suppliers. The Japanese 
government has formulated the objective in its New National Energy Strategy to 
increase the ratio of overseas energy resources development by Japanese companies to 
the entire import of oil to 40% by 2030.
59 Furthermore, a delegation of Japanese 
politicians and businessmen has recently undertaken a trade mission to several Middle 
Eastern countries to strengthen the relations.
60 South-Korea has fostered ties with the 
suppliers of the foreign stockpiling facilities on its ground, and it aims to become a 
regional oil hub.
61 And China has strong ties with the African countries it imports oil 
from: the country provides these states with large sums of development aid in exchange 
for oil contracts.
62 This implies a situation in Northeast Asia where it is not only 
difficult to agree on a common position, but where even friction between the different 
national energy strategies and a common cooperation framework exist.   
This situation is similar to the situation in the European Union. As the EU is 
strongly import-dependent, and an internal market has been realized, it was considered 
useful to create a common external energy policy that should make sure that the EU was 
‘speaking with one voice’ to the supplier states. A number of initiatives was set up, such 
as the Energy Charter Treaty, which aimed at setting up long-term cooperation on issues 
that increase security of energy supplies, such as protection of investments and transit 
issues,
63  the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is a 
dialogue with the large oil-producing countries in the Middle East. These initiatives are, 
however, at best symbolic; they often include many statements for increasing security 
and sustainability, but almost no agreements on how this should be achieved exactly. 
And the relationship with Russia, the most important energy supplier to the EU, is also 
more about keeping each other up-to-date than that actual political results are 
produced.
64 Russia has always refused to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, and the 
EU-Russia Energy Dialogue recently failed to produce any results; not even a joint 
statement was drafted. 
Meanwhile, bilateral relations between energy producing countries and 
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individual EU member states appear to be more productive. A notorious example in this 
respect is the development of the Nord Stream pipeline between Russia and Germany. 
This pipeline bypasses Poland which is distressed and fears shortages of gas when it 
will be piped directly to Western Europe via Germany. And this is not the only case in 
which the Russian gas company Gazprom is using the lack of coherent external energy 
policy by trying to play off the different EU member states; by offering bilateral 
contracts to countries that are tempted to secure the supplies to their own country, and 
become a ‘hub state’ in the face of a lacking robust common external policy. Italian oil 
company Eni, for instance, mirrors the Nord Stream project when it made a deal with 
Russia’s Gazprom to build a southern gas pipeline from Russia directly to Austria and 
Italy. 
Although bilateral relations appear to be more effective on the short term, 
cooperation between the EU and third parties such as the EU-Russia Dialogue should 
not be brushed aside as being irrelevant. Especially the symbolic meaning of the 
above-mentioned Dialogue is strong and it provides the parties with an official channel 
for communication. Furthermore, some successes have indeed been achieved on specific 
topics. An example is the removal of the so-called ‘destination clauses’ from all 
contracts with the Algerian national gas producer Sonatrach.
65 Destination clauses 
prevent buyers from reselling energy resources outside the borders of their nation, 
which is disadvantageous for the Single European Market in which energy is supposed 
to be distributed freely across national borders. 
Thus, although establishing a common bargaining position towards the energy 
supplying countries appears to be a very promising area for cooperation that could have 
many benefits to the countries in the region, looking at the situation in Northeast Asia 
and at the experiences of the European Union, it seems very unlikely that cooperation in 
this area will take place in the near future. Even in the EU, where a strongly developed 
cooperation framework is in place, countries still prefer to promote bilateral ties. 
However in the case of the abolishment of the destination clauses the EU would 
probably not have achieved what it did if cooperation had not been in place. If the 
Northeast Asian countries can identify a topic that is likewise in their common interest, 
they might also be able to achieve a comparable result. Perhaps the issue of the Asian 
premium could function as a starting point for developing some cooperation, but 
generally it can be said that if the Northeast Asian countries would manage to establish 
cooperation in this area, it is only likely to happen in a more distant future.   
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5. Conclusion 
Northeast Asian energy cooperation is a topic that is at the forefront of the attention at 
the moment. Facing a situation of tight energy markets and resource nationalism, the 
countries in the region hope to increase their energy supply security situation 
coordinately. Furthermore, they aim to consume energy in a more sustainable manner. 
However, within regional integration frameworks, such as the EU, countries are likely 
to keep on promoting their national interests rather than developing a common 
approach; especially in the case of security-related issues. Therefore, bottom-up, 
topic-wise integration is likely to be a better approach for the Northeast Asian countries 
to establish energy cooperation than a top-down approach of installing an extensive 
cooperation framework first. Nevertheless, installing a top-down cooperation 
framework on the same time is also necessary for taking away political obstacles. This 
topical cooperation could lead to a (neo)functionalist process of ongoing cooperation 
later on. 
The most likely topics that could provide a start for this bottom-up approach 
for cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries concern sustainability, such as 
the transfer of technology to enhance energy efficiency and develop renewable energy 
sources. In May 2007, an agreement was reached between the Japanese and Chinese 
prime ministers to enhance cooperation and facilitate technology transfer from the 
energy efficient Japan to the very energy inefficient China. Afterwards, more security 
oriented topics such as stockpiling and safe transportation can be addressed, although 
especially achieving some level of common external policy is likely to prove very 
difficult. At the same time, not too many topics should be attempted to cooperate on at 
the same time, as this might lead to contradictory goals. Generally, it can be concluded 
that although energy security cooperation appears to have great potential, in practice it 
is very difficult to establish, even when the states have a long history of integration in 
place, like in the case of the EU.   
 IEEJ: April 2008 
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